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I. INTRODUCTION 
A recanting witness is a liar.  Either he lied at trial or he is lying 
now.  When the recanting witness’s new story is joined by others, so 
that his solo is now a chorus, the judicial system must find the 
delicate balance between fairness to society and protection of the 
individual defendant’s rights.  When the case is old and the 
recanting witnesses many, the difficulty of finding that balance is 
even greater.  Such were the circumstances facing the Minnesota 
Supreme Court when, in 2004, it heard the case of Darby Opsahl, a 
man convicted in 1992 of a murder that occurred in 1986. 1 
 
       †     The author is a shareholder in the law firm Halleland, Lewis, Nilan & 
Johnson, P.A. where he practices in the areas of internal investigation and fraud, 
intellectual property and complex commercial litigation. 
 1. See generally State v. Opsahl, 677 N.W.2d 414 (Minn. 2004) [hereinafter 
Opsahl II].  By the time he was convicted and sentenced, Opsahl was confined to a 
wheelchair having been rendered quadriplegic in a car accident in 1990.  See State 
1
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II. HISTORY OF THE OPSAHL CASE 
A. The Murder and the Murder Investigation 
On October 14, 1986, someone broke into a farmhouse in 
Lester Prairie and shot Margaret Rehmann.2  The murder baffled 
the authorities for years; weeks after the killing they had no clues as 
to the motive for the shooting and no real evidence pointing 
toward any suspect.3  Though the farmhouse door had been forced 
open, there was no sign of a struggle inside, nothing was taken, and 
the house had not even been searched.4  On the day of his wife’s 
murder, Irvin Rehmann had lunch with her, then went back to 
work on his son’s farm less than a mile away.5  When he returned 
home at about 5:45 that afternoon, his wife of 43 years was dead on 
the kitchen floor with a .44 caliber gunshot wound to her chest.6 
The investigation of the murder took a long and winding road 
to the indictment of Darby Opsahl.  A year after the murder, Jeffrey 
Olson told the Carver County Sheriff’s Department that his friend 
Darby Opsahl might know something about the murder, and that 
he wanted to talk.7  Police met with Opsahl the next day, at which 
time he told them that he and John Kanniainen had committed 
burglaries in the Lester Prairie area about the time of the murder, 
and that Kanniainen possessed a .44 caliber handgun.8  Opsahl told 
investigators about the burglary of a farmhouse, which, “by his 
description, matched the Rehmann residence fairly accurately.”9  
Opsahl said that while he stayed in the car and worked on the 
radio, Kanniainen had gone to the front door.10  Opsahl recalled 
seeing a woman with “brown hair, wearing red, at the door.”11  He 
also noticed some chickens.12  While Kanniainen was in the house, 
 
v. Opsahl, 513 N.W.2d 249, 252 (Minn. 1994) [hereinafter Opsahl I]. 
 2. Opsahl I, 513 N.W.2d at 251. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 252. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.  The investigation of the crime scene revealed that Ms. Rehmann was 
wearing a blue smock over a pink blouse.  Id. 
 12. Id. 
2
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Opsahl heard a shot.13  When he got back to the car, Kanniainen 
told Opsahl he shot someone inside and displayed some half-dollar 
coins he had taken from the house.14 
After this interview, police drove Opsahl and Olson to Lester 
Prairie.15  According to the police, Opsahl visibly reacted when he 
saw the Rehmann farmhouse and stated that it could have been the 
place he and Kanniainen had burglarized.16 
Several months went by.  In April, 1988, police confronted 
Opsahl with the fact that Kanniainen could not have burglarized 
the Rehmann residence because he had been in New Jersey the 
entire month of October, 1986.17  Opsahl responded that “if 
Kanniainen had not done it, then he was not involved either.”18  
Some time during the same month Opsahl took and passed a 
polygraph test.19 
The investigation went dormant again for another year until 
June, 1989 when investigators took another statement from 
Opsahl.20  Opsahl “again stated that Kanniainen had . . . a .44 
caliber handgun,” but made conflicting statements regarding 
Kanniainen’s presence in Minnesota at the time of the murder.21  
Opsahl also “accompanied investigators to a store where he was 
shown a lineup of handguns” from which he identified a .44 caliber 
Magnum “as the kind of weapon Kanniainen had during the 1986 
burglary.”22 
Another year went by until April, 1990, when Opsahl spoke 
with police investigators for a third time, telling them that Olson, 
who detested Kanniainen, had suggested to Opsahl that they blame 
Kanniainen for the Rehmann murder.23  “Opsahl said that he and 
Olson both knew that Kanniainen had been charged with a capital 
murder in Florida and was in jail when Opsahl first met with police 
in 1987.”24 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Opsahl I, 513 N.W.2d at 252. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
3
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B. The Trial and the Evidence 
In April, 1992, a grand jury indicted Darby Opsahl and Jeffrey 
Olson for the murder.25  The trial began in October of that year.26  
The evidence at trial linking Opsahl to the murder was thin.  A 
shoe print, fingerprints and a palm print were found at the crime 
scene.27  None of this physical evidence matched Opsahl.28  The 
murder weapon was never found.29  More importantly, the evidence 
that did link Opsahl to the crime was circumstantial and far from 
compelling.  First, the prosecutors introduced evidence of Opsahl’s 
statements in which he had described the farmhouse to police, had 
“apparently” known that a .44 caliber weapon was used, that older 
half-dollar coins had been taken, and that there were chickens at 
the farm where the murder had occurred.30  In addition, a number 
of Opsahl’s “friends” testified to conversations they had with 
Opsahl, or in his presence, in which Opsahl implicated himself in 
the murder.31  Opsahl was convicted of first degree murder—
intentionally causing death during a burglary of a dwelling—and 
was sentenced to life imprisonment.32 
C. Direct Appeal 
On appeal, Opsahl challenged the grand jury indictment as 
having been based in part upon the admission of statements 
erroneously claiming that Opsahl had failed a lie detector test.33  
This mistake was compounded when the prosecutor refused to 
allow one of the detectives to testify (in response to a question 
posed by one of the grand jurors) that Opsahl had taken a lie 
detector test but the results had been favorable.34  Opsahl argued 
that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s actions confirmed the 
 
 25. See id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 251. 
 28. Id.  The police were unable to identify whom the shoe print, fingerprints, 
and palm print belonged to.  Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See id. at 252, 255. 
 31. Id. at 252–53; Opsahl II, 677 N.W.2d at 418–19. 
 32. Opsahl I, 513 N.W.2d at 251 n.1. 
 33. Id. at 253.  “Results of polygraph tests, as well as evidence that a defendant 
took, or refused to take such a test, are not admissible in Minnesota in either 
criminal or civil trials.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
 34. Id. 
4
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erroneous impression that Opsahl had failed the lie detector test.35  
The court rejected this argument, finding that the prosecutor’s 
admonition to the jury to disregard all evidence regarding 
polygraph examinations cured any defect.36 
Second, the court concluded that statements made by others 
in the presence of Opsahl, but not testified to at trial, were 
admissible.37  Several witnesses were allowed to testify as to 
statements that Olson and Tim Efteland had allegedly made.38  
Neither Olson nor Efteland were available to testify at trial.39  The 
court found that these statements were admissible because the 
information was elicited by Opsahl’s attorney and no objection to 
the testimony was made at the time.40 
Third, and most importantly, the court addressed the 
sufficiency of the evidence.41  Opsahl argued that “the evidence 
presented at trial was legally insufficient to convict him because it 
was entirely circumstantial and based in large measure on 
statements Opsahl [allegedly] made to investigators and to other 
individuals.”42  The statements made to police were somewhat 
ambiguous; the statements made to others were less so.  The court, 
evaluating the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,43 
stated: 
Opsahl also made numerous admissions to the crime to 
his friends, including Ross Reinitz, Laura Roberts, Robert 
Beckman, Richard Rogowski and his former girlfriend, 
Marina Allan.  The jury had an opportunity to hear all the 
testimony and to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.  
 
 35. Id. 
 36. See id.  The prosecutor “properly cautioned the jurors on the use of 
polygraph statements, both at the time the statements were made and at the end 
of testimony.”  Id.  The court also stated that “[t]he prosecutor did not elicit the 
testimony about the polygraph tests . . . .”  Id. 
 37. Id. at 253–55. 
 38. Id. at 254. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 255. 
 42. Id. 
 43. On appeal, where the defendant raises the sufficiency of the evidence to 
sustain the verdict, the question is subjected to this favorable review.  Id.  The 
verdict is sustained if, giving the State all benefit of the doubt, there is sufficient 
evidence that a reasonable juror could find the defendant guilty.  Id.; see, e.g., State 
v. Scruggs, 421 N.W.2d 707, 713 (Minn. 1988).  As the court noted in Opsahl I, 
when applying this standard, “[w]e will assume that the jury disbelieved any 
testimony in conflict with [a guilty verdict].”  513 N.W.2d at 255. 
5
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In our review, we must assume the jury believed the state’s 
witnesses and rejected contrary evidence.  Given that 
assumption [that the jury credited the testimony of all these 
witnesses], there was sufficient evidence to convict 
Opsahl.44 
 
III. OPSAHL REDUX 
 
A. In the Trial Court 
 
In 2002, a decade after Opsahl’s conviction, The Innocence 
Project of Minnesota45 began investigating Opsahl’s case.  The 
Project re-interviewed numerous witnesses, chased down 
unfollowed leads regarding physical evidence, and in general 
reinvestigated the investigation. 
On October 29, 2002, Opsahl petitioned the trial court for 
post-conviction relief,46 claiming that he was entitled to a new trial, 
or at least to an evidentiary hearing, because the chorus of friends 
had now recanted their trial testimony.47 
In addition, Opsahl raised claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
that were intertwined with the recantations.48  The recanting 
witnesses allegedly provided misleading testimony under pressure 
from the prosecutor to do so.  Reinitz and Rogowski, who were on 
probation at the time, claimed that the prosecutor threatened to 
revoke their probation if they did not provide testimony favorable 
to the State.49  Similarly, Roberts claimed that she informed the 
prosecutor of the unreliability of her memory and was encouraged 
to “testify without qualification.”50 
The trial court rejected Opsahl’s petition for a new trial as well 
 
 44. Id. at 255 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 45. The Innocence Project of Minnesota (IPMN) is dedicated to securing the 
exoneration of persons convicted of crimes they did not in fact commit.  It focuses 
on claims of actual innocence as distinct from legal defenses such as self-defense.  
Unlike some of its sister organizations in other states, however, the IPMN does not 
limit its review to cases involving only DNA evidence.  Though the Opsahl case 
presented a claim of actual innocence, its procedural posture did not present an 
opportunity for exoneration (though it could have resulted in a new trial and a 
not-guilty verdict). 
 46. See MINN. STAT. § 590.04 (2004). 
 47. Opsahl II, 677 N.W.2d at 419. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 420. 
 50. Id. 
6
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as the petition for an evidentiary hearing, finding that the 
recantations were unreliable and, therefore, insufficient to make 
the court “reasonably well satisfied that the trial testimony had in 
fact been false.”51  As Judge Yost, the original trial judge in the case, 
summed it up: 
[At best, the court is] dealing with a chorus of liars, with 
the only question being whether the concert was at trial, 
or is it now, at the motion for a retrial.  If it was at trial, 
then they are perjurers all and if it is now, then they have 
the unique ability to have their memory sharpen with the 
passage of time.52 
 
B. In the Minnesota Supreme Court 
 
1. The State of the Evidence 
 
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the trial court and 
remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing.53  This time the 
supreme court review was governed by a different standard.54  On 
direct appeal the court had reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the verdict; here they reviewed the 
trial court’s findings regarding the recantations under an abuse of 
discretion standard.55  In this opinion, unlike the 1994 opinion, the 
court restated the testimony of the “friends” with greater detail and 
precision.  A review of that evidence, as described in the recent 
decision, is thus worthwhile.  As the court described it: 
The State’s case relied on statements made by Opsahl to 
several acquaintances that implicated him in the murder.  
Ross Reinitz testified that he heard Olson tell Opsahl that 
they “could always take care of [Opsahl’s neighbor like 
they] took care of that old bitch by Lester Prairie.”  Allen 
Kroells provided similar testimony.  Laura Roberts 
testified that Opsahl told her that he had hurt someone 
during a robbery near Winsted, a small town near Lester 
Prairie.  Marina Allen, Opsahl’s former live-in girlfriend, 
testified that during a fight, Opsahl told her to “shut up or 
 
 51. Id. at 420, 423.  The “reasonably well satisfied” standard comes from 
Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928). 
 52. Opsahl II, 677 N.W.2d at 427. 
 53. Id. at 425. 
 54. Id. at 421. 
 55. Id. 
7
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I’m going to shoot you like I did that little old lady.”  
Richard Rogowski testified that at a Fourth of July party in 
1988, Opsahl admitted to him that he burglarized a house 
where someone was shot.  Dean Johnson testified that 
Opsahl told him that he had shot and killed a woman 
during a burglary.  According to Robert Beckman, Opsahl 
told him that Olson shot a woman in the head with a .44 
caliber handgun.  Cory Telthoester testified that Olson 
told him that he and Opsahl burglarized the home and 
that Opsahl shot an older woman in the house while 
Olson was on his way out the window of the house.  The 
State presented no physical evidence linking Opsahl to 
the murder . . . . 
Opsahl testified in his own defense but called no other 
witnesses.  He denied that he was involved in the murder  
. . . or that he ever told anyone that he had committed a 
murder . . . .  Opsahl denied making any admissions to 
Rogowski at a Fourth of July party in 1988, claiming 
instead that he attended a fireworks display in 
Minneapolis.56 
In his petition for post-conviction relief, Opsahl submitted the 
following recantation evidence.  Rogowski, in an affidavit, claimed 
that he made up the entire story and never even attended a Fourth 
of July party with Opsahl.57  Reinitz swore that he had told 
prosecutors that he did not hear the exchange between Opsahl and 
Olson clearly, “and that he was unsure of who made the original 
comment about the murder.”58  He also swore in his affidavit that 
“at the time of the conversation, he knew of the murder 
investigation and assumed that the two were joking.”59  Similarly, in 
her affidavit, Roberts stated that she used large amounts of drugs at 
the time of the event and that her memory was suspect.60  William 
O’Keefe, a private investigator, interviewed Dean Johnson, who, 
though he did not recant his prior testimony, nonetheless implied 
“that he had lied on the stand when he testified that he had just 
opened his first beer of the night when Opsahl made his 
incriminating statements.”61  Similarly, Morrie Beaulier, the 
 
 56. Id. at 418–19. 
 57. Id. at 419. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 419–20. 
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attorney who represented Opsahl in 1998, swore that “Marina Allen 
completely recanted her testimony to him, claiming that she 
fabricated her testimony out of anger at Opsahl, who had been an 
abusive boyfriend.”62 
2. The Standard of Review 
In reviewing the post-conviction proceedings, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court will affirm that ruling absent an abuse of 
discretion.63  In determining whether to grant a new trial based 
upon witness recantations, Minnesota follows the three-prong test 
articulated in Larrison v. United States.64  To receive a new trial, the 
petitioner must establish all three of the following prongs by a fair 
preponderance of the evidence: (1) the court must be reasonably 
well satisfied that the testimony in question was false; (2) that 
without that testimony the jury might have reached a different verdict; 
and (3) that the petitioner was surprised and/or did not know of 
the falsity until after trial.65  In Minnesota, the third prong is not a 
condition precedent for granting a new trial, but merely a factor to 
be considered.66 
Though the standard for granting a new trial is governed by 
Larrison, the showing required to receive an evidentiary hearing is 
set by statute that imposes a much lower burden.67  Minnesota 
Statutes section 590.04, subdivision 1 requires the post-conviction 
court to hold an evidentiary hearing “unless the petition and the 
files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the 
petitioner is entitled to no relief.”68  Thus, though the petitioner 
must allege facts—not mere conclusions,69 that if proven, would 
entitle him to a new trial, the post-conviction court is required to 
resolve all doubts in favor of granting the evidentiary hearing70 and 
must do so when material facts are in dispute.71  In circumstantial 
evidence cases, such as Opsahl’s, evidentiary hearings are deemed 
 
 62. Id. at 420. 
 63. Id. at 422. 
 64. 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928). 
 65. Opsahl II, 677 N.W.2d at 423. 
 66. Id. (citing Ferguson v. State, 645 N.W.2d 437, 442 (Minn. 2002)). 
 67. Id. (citing Ferguson, 645 N.W.2d at 446). 
 68. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2004)). 
 69. Id. (citing Ferguson, 645 N.W.2d at 446). 
 70. Id. (citing King v. State, 649 N.W.2d 149, 156 (Minn. 2002)). 
 71. Id. (citing Hodgson v. State, 540 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Minn. 1995)). 
9
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particularly important.72 
3. The Supreme Court’s Decision 
As stated above, the trial court denied Opsahl’s petition 
without holding an evidentiary hearing,73 thereby implicitly finding 
the petitioner had presented no facts that could conceivably entitle 
him to relief.74  Stated in another fashion, the trial court found that 
the petition and the supporting affidavits conclusively showed that 
Opsahl was not entitled to a new trial; therefore, no hearing was 
necessary. 
In arriving at its decision, the trial court found that the facts 
presented could never meet the standard for a new trial—the court 
was not now and would never be “well satisfied” that the testimony 
of the recanting witnesses was false.75  “Based on [his own personal] 
recollection of the trial, the [judge] concluded that Marina Allen’s 
recantation was not reliable” and “that Reinitz and Roberts had a 
better recollection of events at trial than [twelve years later] at the 
post-conviction stage.”76  “With respect to Johnson, the court noted 
that he did not change the substance of his testimony.”77  The trial 
court simply ignored the affidavit of Rogowski.78 
Because the trial court had not been reasonably well satisfied 
that the recanting testimony was false, it did not have to consider 
the second prong of the Larrison test.79  Notwithstanding that fact, 
however, the trial court had evaluated the second prong of the 
Larrison test, concluding that the jury would not have reached a 
different verdict even if the recanted testimony had never been 
admitted.80 
On review, the Minnesota Supreme Court made a number of 
important findings.  First, the court found that the allegations in 
Opsahl’s petition and the supporting affidavits easily met the 
minimal standard for an evidentiary hearing under Minnesota 
Statutes section 590.04, subdivision 1.81  The factual allegations in 
 
 72. Id. (citing Ferguson, 645 N.W.2d at 446). 
 73. Id. at 417. 
 74. See id. at 423. 
 75. See id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 420. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. at 423–24. 
 80. Id. at 423. 
 81. See id. at 424. 
10
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the post-conviction pleadings were such that the trial court, as a 
matter of law, could not have found that Opsahl was not even 
entitled to a hearing.  After all, the factual allegations raised the 
possibility that the court, after a hearing, could be “reasonably well 
satisfied” that the prior testimony had indeed been false.  By 
concluding that the recantations were unreliable without first 
evaluating the credibility of the witnesses at an evidentiary hearing, 
the post-conviction court misapplied Minnesota Statutes section 
590.04 and abused its discretion. 
The trial court had improperly leapfrogged over the 
evidentiary hearing requirement to address the ultimate issue and, 
in so doing, had glossed over the relevant evidentiary standard.  
When addressing whether an evidentiary hearing should occur, the 
trial court must give the benefit of the doubt to the new factual 
allegations regarding the recanting witnesses.  An evidentiary 
hearing may only be avoided if the petition and the affidavits 
“conclusively show” that the petitioner is entitled to no relief or, in 
other words, that even assuming the accuracy of the petition and 
the affidavits, there is conclusive proof that the court could never 
be reasonably well satisfied that the original testimony of the 
recanting witnesses had been false.82  The district court had 
impermissibly made a credibility determination based upon its 
recollection of how those witnesses appeared at the trial ten years 
earlier rather than evaluating the credibility of their new story at 
the time of the hearing.  The supreme court mandated the trial 
court evaluate that credibility at a full-blown evidentiary hearing.83 
The supreme court got it right on this issue.  When evaluating 
a petition to determine whether an evidentiary hearing should 
occur, the trial court is required to assume that the evidence could 
be credible.84  In this case, the trial court did not assume the 
credibility of the evidence in deciding whether a hearing was 
warranted; instead, it expressly made a credibility determination 
and found a hearing unnecessary.85 
Turning to the second prong of the Larrison test, the supreme 
court held “that the district court abused its discretion by 
concluding that the jury would not have reached a different result 
 
 82. See id. 
 83. Id. at 425. 
 84. See id. at 423–24. 
 85. Id. 
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without the recanted testimony.”86  The supreme court specifically 
found that the second prong of the Larrison test was met without 
the need for further proceedings.87  The court has held that if the 
trial court is “reasonably well satisfied” that the recanted testimony 
was false, then as a matter of law, it might have made a difference, 
thereby warranting a new trial.88 
Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the supreme 
court had little difficulty finding an abuse of the trial court’s 
discretion: 
The petition and affidavits challenge the truth or 
believability of five out of seven witnesses who testified 
that they heard Opsahl make incriminating statements.  
These recantations are particularly significant because 
there was no physical evidence linking Opsahl to the 
murder.  Because Opsahl’s petition calls into question 
such a significant part of the state’s circumstantial case, we 
conclude that the postconviction court abused its 
discretion by concluding that the jury would have reached 
the same result without the recanted testimony.89 
In short, if the trial court were to find after an evidentiary hearing 
that the recanting were witnesses credible, Opsahl would receive a 
wholly new trial. 
The supreme court also addressed the merits of Opsahl’s 
claims of prosecutorial misconduct that were rejected by the trial 
court.90  Threatening to revoke the probation of a witness in order 
to secure favorable testimony clearly constitutes prosecutorial 
misconduct.91  The remedy for that misconduct is a new trial unless 
the misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, which is, 
in turn, defined as only occurring “if the verdict rendered was 
surely unattributable to the error.”92  Here again, the supreme 
court reversed the trial court’s decision as to its rejection of the 
evidentiary hearing.93  Since the post-conviction petition and 
affidavits stated facts that, if proven, would constitute prosecutorial 
misconduct, it was incumbent upon the trial court to at least hold 
 
 86. Id. at 424. 
 87. See id. 
 88. Ferguson, 645 N.W.2d at 444–45. 
 89. Opsahl II, 677 N.W.2d at 424. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 8.4(c), (d) (2002). 
 92. State v. Hunt, 615 N.W.2d 294, 301–02 (Minn. 2000). 
 93. Opsahl II, 677 N.W.2d at 424–25. 
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the evidentiary hearing to make factual findings as to the witness’ 
credibility.94  As the court stated, “when a petitioner presents sworn 
statements that some of the testimony used to convict him was 
falsified and the product of improper coercion by the prosecution, 
such allegations [require]...a postconviction evidentiary hearing.”95  
Given the standard on this issue, if the trial court determined that 
the witnesses were credible, then Opsahl would be entitled to a new 
trial. 
Finally, the majority opinion addressed the State’s alternative 
argument, that the lapse of time between Opsahl’s conviction and 
the filing of his post-conviction petition was so great as to preclude 
him from receiving relief.96  The trial court did not reach this 
argument.97  Accordingly, the supreme court remanded the case for 
the evidentiary hearing and directed the trial court that if it 
determined that Opsahl was otherwise entitled to a new trial, it 
“shall address the state’s alternative argument that the ten year 
lapse in time... should preclude him from receiving relief.”98 
Justice Gilbert dissented.99  He took issue with that part of the 
opinion remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing based on 
the alleged recanted testimony of five trial witnesses.100  Justice 
Gilbert offered three reasons for his dissent.  First, because the 
recanted testimony was presented by affidavit, a form of evidence 
provided for in Minn. Stat. section 590.04, subdivision 3, he argued 
that Opsahl had in effect already received an evidentiary hearing.101  
Opsahl’s election to provide evidence in the form of affidavits 
meant that he had enjoyed his one bite at the apple.  Justice 
Gilbert’s dissent on this point is not without some support in the 
record.  The trial court, in its order, made detailed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law–thirty-nine pages in all.102  As Justice Gilbert 
noted, Judge Yost, the judge who presided over the original trial in 
1992, was uniquely well-situated to assess witness credibility—with 
or without personal appearances by those witnesses.103 
 
 94. Id. at 424. 
 95. Id. at 425. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 426. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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But is this the correct view of the statutory provision of an 
evidentiary hearing?  According to Minnesota Statutes section 
590.04, a hearing on the petition “shall be in open court,” the court 
may order the petitioner to be present at the hearing, and in the 
discretion of the court “it may receive evidence in the form of 
affidavit, deposition, or oral testimony.”104  In this case, Opsahl was 
not afforded an evidentiary hearing.105  The affidavits filed in 
support of the petition were not intended to be in lieu of evidence 
that Opsahl’s attorneys would have presented had an evidentiary 
hearing been granted.  The court did not agree to an evidentiary 
hearing with some evidence to be submitted in the form of 
affidavits; rather, it read the affidavits and based on its own 
recollection determined that no further evidentiary hearing was 
necessary.106 
Second, Justice Gilbert opined that the majority erred because 
the allegations, even if true, did not attack the “overwhelming 
amount of inculpatory (nonrecanted) evidence supporting the 
guilty verdict.”107  In this regard, Justice Gilbert’s dissent misses the 
mark.  The standard is not whether the recantations attack all of 
the inculpatory evidence, but whether the recanted testimony was 
significant enough that, without it, a jury might not have reached 
the same result.108  Nor can one agree with Justice Gilbert’s 
weighing of the evidence.  In this case, there was no physical 
evidence linking Opsahl to the crime or the crime scene.109  The 
unrecanted evidence, like the recanted evidence, was not only 
entirely circumstantial, it was virtually all based on statements 
attributed to Opsahl himself.110  Five of the seven witnesses who 
provided that evidence later recanted.111  In that circumstance, it is 
hard to see how the recantation, if believable, might not have led 
the jury to reach a different result. 
Justice Gilbert’s opinion also points out that on direct appeal 
in 1994, the supreme court had already found that the evidence 
 
 104. MINN. STAT. § 590.04, subds. 2, 3 (2002). 
 105. Opsahl II, 677 N.W.2d at 425. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 426 (Gilbert, J., dissenting). 
 108. Opsahl II, 677 N.W.2d at 423 (relying on the three-prong test established 
in Larrison v. U.S., 24 F.2d 82, 87–88). 
 109. Id. at 419. 
 110. See id. at 424. 
 111. Id. 
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was more than sufficient to sustain the conviction.112  But this 
observation offers little justification given the procedural posture of 
the case.  On direct appeal, the standard of review considers the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.113  Viewed from 
that perspective in 1994, the evidence was sufficient, the court itself 
placing great weight on the witness statements that were later 
recanted.114  In 2004, Justice Gilbert wrote “[t]he alleged recanted 
testimony in this case was not pivotal to appellant’s conviction.”115  
The mere fact that on direct review the whole of the evidence was 
sufficient to sustain the verdict provides little insight into the 
question whether, without much of that evidence, the jury might 
have reached a different result. 
Finally, Justice Gilbert found the trial court’s thirty-nine pages 
of findings of fact and its assessment of credibility to be 
persuasive.116  The trial court, in his view, clearly assessed the 
credibility of the witnesses by comparing the inherent credibility of 
the affidavit testimony against his own memory of the credibility of 
the witnesses as they appeared at trial.  117In the end, Justice Gilbert 
also pointed out the inherent unfairness to the State if this case 
were to be ordered for retrial.118  In such a situation, the Court 
noted, that “[t]he murder took place 17 years ago and the trial 
took place 11 years ago.  Two material witnesses who testified at 
trial have since died and two others apparently cannot be located.  
Prejudice to the state may be a legitimate problem in this case 
should the postconviction court determine on remand that a new 
trial would otherwise be warranted.”119 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE LEGACY OF OPSAHL 
When considering the long-term meaning of Opsahl, two lines 
of inquiry are pertinent.  First, is Opsahl precedential?  Second, if a 
new trial is warranted, what can, will, or should the result be? 
 
 112. Id. at 426 (Gilbert, J., dissenting). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See Opsahl I, 513 N.W.2d at 255. 
 115. Opsahl II, 677 N.W.2d at 426 (Gilbert, J., dissenting). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 427. 
 119. Id. 
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A. Is Opsahl Precedential? 
Has the Opsahl decision changed or clarified the law in any 
significant respect, or is it merely a decision that applies well-settled 
law to a unique factual setting?  On the one hand, Opsahl has not 
changed the standards for receiving a new trial.  The supreme 
court reaffirmed its adherence to Larrison.120  This, in itself, is no 
small matter.  The majority of federal circuits (including the 8th 
Circuit) do not adhere to Larrison, but require a higher level of 
proof in order to obtain a new trial.121  In those jurisdictions it is 
not enough to show that the jury might have reached a different 
result; instead, one must show that the absence of the testimony 
would probably have led to an acquittal.122  The court’s reaffirmation 
of Larrison maintains the more lenient standard. 
Secondly, Opsahl makes it clear that in applying that standard 
to a circumstantial evidence case, the recantation of any significant 
testimony will almost surely meet the “might-have-made-a-
difference” standard. 
Finally, the majority opinion seems to have adopted a bright-
line test for obtaining an evidentiary hearing under Minnesota 
Statutes section 590.04, subdivision 3.  It seems clear now that the 
evidentiary hearing required by this statute means the taking of live 
testimony.  While the trial court may have felt that it had held an 
evidentiary hearing by considering the affidavits and assessing its 
own recollection, the supreme court disagreed.  When witness 
credibility is at stake, the court must observe the witnesses live, if 
possible.  In a circumstantial evidence case involving the 
recantation of testimony, such a hearing is hardly controversial. 
B. What Happens Next? 
If the trial court had found that a new trial was warranted (it 
did not) because it was reasonably well-satisfied that the testimony 
 
 120. Id. at 422. 
 121. U.S. v. Williams, 233 F.3d 592, 594 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Today we join 
several other circuits in rejecting Larrison.”) (citing U.S. v. Sinclair, 109 F.3d 1527, 
1532 (10th Cir.1997); U.S. v. Provost, 969 F.2d 617, 622 (8th Cir.1992); U.S. v. 
Krasny, 607 F.2d 840, 844–45 (9th Cir.1979); U.S. v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 246 (2d 
Cir.1975)). 
 122. Id. at 593 (“[A] defendant is not entitled to a retrial on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence unless he can show that ‘a new trial would probably produce an 
acquittal.’” (citing and adopting Thompson v. U.S., 188 F.2d 652, 653 (D.C.Cir. 
1951))). 
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was false, the question is, what would have become of Darby 
Opsahl?  Setting aside the legal niceties of this issue, it appears that 
a few policy observations are possible. 
First, despite the involvement of The Innocence Project, 
Opsahl’s case is not an exoneration case.  Absent clear scientific or 
objectively verifiable evidence, Darby Opsahl could not have been 
exonerated in the sense of being declared innocent and freed from 
prison.  He might have received a new trial and prevailed, or the 
prosecution decided that it could not have re-tried the case for lack 
of evidence given the passage of time; but it seems unlikely that 
either the court or the prosecution would have declared Opsahl an 
innocent man. 
This observation leads to a discussion of the least satisfying 
aspect of Opsahl.  The supreme court directed the trial court to 
weigh the prejudice to the State occasioned by the passage of time 
against Opsahl’s entitlement to an “otherwise . . . warranted” new 
trial.123  If Opsahl was otherwise entitled to a new trial it is because 
the trial court was reasonably well satisfied that the recanted 
testimony was false and that, if it had not been admitted the first 
time, a jury might have found Opsahl not guilty. 
This is the delicate balance described above.  The individual 
defendant has a right to a true presumption of innocence.124  If a 
jury “might have” acquitted him but for tainted evidence, the 
presumption leans toward a new trial.  Yet, in this case the 
recanting witnesses are friends of the defendant, many with their 
own axes to grind against the prosecution.  This is why the 
credibility determination is critical.  The State will truly be 
prejudiced by having to prosecute a crime that is eighteen years 
old.  The State and the victims have interests at stake as well.  These 
interests and prejudices are significant in striking the delicate 
balance. 
In the final analysis, the supreme court left this decision to the 
trial court because the case presented by the chorus of liars is so 
intractable, particularly in an appellate review.  One pictures the 
justices holding their noses as they review the recantation evidence 
and holding their breath as they awaited the decision below. 
 
 
 123. Opsahl II, 677 N.W.2d at 427. 
 124. State v. Wagner, 637 N.W.2d 330, 338 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (“It is 
elementary fundamental justice that the only presumption in criminal law is the 
presumption of innocence.”). 
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